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TRUTH AND THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE  
OF PERCEPTION
The main objective of the article is to present the phenomenological understanding of the 
idea of truth (alētheia). In the Heideggerian sense, alētheia is not limited to the traditional 
rendering of truth as coherence or correspondence. In other words, truth is not restricted 
to the appropriate or inappropriate ways of the representation of given aspects of cognitive 
experience. Instead, truth comes close to the notion of perception in the sense that it refers to 
the general way in which the world is unconcealed to human understanding. Of course, the 
adopted approach asks us to bracket the subject/object division that stands behind traditio-
nal metaphysical thinking ever since the time of Plato. In other words, the subject is not the 
starting point of experience; rather, the subject is a passive recipient of the kind of being-in-
-the-world—to use Merleau-Pontyian terminology—that is extending around it. Accounting 
for the phenomenological understanding of truth obliges us also to look at language not in 
the representative sense, but rather to regard it as the essencing of the vocabulary of being 
through which the world is revealed. This means that language is not just an abstract sign 
system based on the relation of signified—signifier in the Saussurian sense, but the ontological 
position from which we perceive the world and our existence in it. 
KEY WORDS: Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, language, disclosure, truth, accordance, freedom, 
essence, perception, idea. 
Introduction
From a typically hermeneutical perspective, 
the understanding of the notion of truth is 
silhouetted against the Greek term alētheia. 
However, the term possesses a much deeper 
epistemological dimension. In point of fact 
we need to understand alētheia similarly 
to Heidegger, and therefore, take it to de-
signate a phenomenon called disclosure or 
unconcealment. 
Concealment deprives alētheia of 
disclosure yet does not render it sterēsis 
(privation); rather, concealment preserves 
what is most proper to alētheia as its own. 
Considered with respect to truth as disclo-
sedness, concealment is then undisclosed-
ness and accordingly the untruth that is most 
proper to the essence of truth. The conce-
alment of beings as a whole does not first 
show up subsequently as a consequence of 
the fact that knowledge of beings is always 
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fragmentary. The concealment of beings as 
a whole, untruth proper, is older than every 
openedness of this or that being (Heidegger 
1993, p. 130).
Thus, truth as alētheia refers generally 
to the conditions in which the world unfolds 
in our comportment and understanding, and 
therefore, it comes closer to the idea of per-
ception than to the conventional rendering 
of the phenomenon of truth (understood as 
correspondence or coherence). For our pur-
poses, we will divide the notion of truth into 
two different classes. First, we will look at 
the idea of propositional truth which came to 
dominate in the onto-theological tradition. 
The propositional dimension of truth can 
be said to open up the theoretical landscape 
of meaning, where things are reducible to 
the idea of correctness of representation. 
Secondly, our understanding of truth will 
take into account its ontic landscape, i.e., 
ontic truth as the uncoveredness of entities 
within the phenomenological field of expe-
rience. The ontic aspect of truth discloses 
the practical dimension of truth that has 
been disregarded by the onto-theological 
tradition which sought to reduce human 
experience to the notions of rationality and 
consciousness. Taken together what these 
notions make possible is representative 
forms of cognition.
The Propositional Landscape  
of Truth
The propositional understanding of truth is 
reducible, as we have mentioned above, to 
the idea of correctness of representation. 
Truth, therefore, is the effect of what the 
Greeks called homoisis, i.e., correspon-
dence. Another understanding of truth as 
correctness of representation is encapsu-
lated in the dictum, veritas est adaequatio 
intellectus ad rem. Thus, truth as adequation 
is based on the belief that there is a cor-
respondence between a physical entity or 
condition and its direct representation in the 
mind. Therefore, truth as well as knowledge 
is what we achieve when we learn to find the 
necessary links between the transcendental 
ego (the subject) and the physical thing or 
experience (the object).
Needless to say, this is a typically Car-
tesian understanding of knowledge, since 
its foundation is rooted in dualism—recall 
Descartes’s famous example of two separate 
notions of reality that exist side by side and 
need to be attuned for any meaningful ex-
periences to take place. These two monadic 
landscapes of experience are the mind and 
the body, which, as we have mentioned 
before, must be attuned—for, as Descartes 
declares, “the nature of the intelligence 
is distinct from that of the body” (1969, 
p. 129). Nevertheless, the epistemological 
consequences of this thinking ask us to 
go further than that, i.e., not only seek the 
connections between the mind and the body. 
Instead, we should see the whole of human 
experience to be rooted in the subject’s cor-
respondence to objective reality or vice ver-
sa, as the essence of Cartesianism dwells in 
deductionism according to which the world 
is a phenomenon that appears in human de-
ductions and, therefore, it must correspond 
to them. However, we may never know if 
the propositions that we have formed about 
the world are correct, or if they were falla-
ciously inspired by the Cartesian demon 
at whose behest we misperceive reality 
and all our knowledge. The propositional 
understanding of truth, therefore, discloses 
the theoretical landscape of the cogito, the 
royal chamber of subjectivity that sees the 
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world and the experiences that it makes 
possible through the veil of representation. 
In other words, the propositions themselves 
are believed to be the ultimate source of the 
subject’s assumptions connected with the 
world and all possible experiences. 
The Ontic Landscape of Truth
What the propositional understanding of 
truth takes for granted—or what it simply 
fails to comprehend—is that conscio-
usness, and therefore, rationality do not 
constitute the fundamental way in which 
we are. In other words, without denying 
the value of conscious experiences, we 
must signal at this point that the conscious 
experiences in question are not the basic 
way in which we find ourselves involved 
in the world. Therefore, we need to aban-
don the “ghost in the machine” point of 
view criticized, for example, by Gilbert 
Ryle (2001, p. 353) which opens up the 
theoretical (in the sense of representative) 
landscape of meaning in favour of our 
practical involvement in reality; this is 
what Merleau-Ponty understands through 
the expression “the flesh of the world” 
(1964, p. 16). Thus, before we get to be 
conscious, and therefore, before we are in 
a position to formulate any propositions 
about the world that would exemplify the 
all-pervasive influence of representative 
consciousness, we are always and already 
in the world, managing our way in it and 
coping with things on a transparent basis. 
This is how Dreyfus addresses the issue: 
...the natural situation of everyday activities 
is meant to show that the traditional epistemic 
situation of a mind distinct from objects, whether 
observing or acting upon them, is a deficient mode 
of being-in-the-world and cannot, therefore, have 
the braced philosophical implications modern 
philosophers of mind have supposed (Dreyfus 
1991, p. 54).
Our automatic attunement to reality, 
which is that of being-in-the-world, is cha-
racterized by all the actions that we commit 
ourselves to that are not beshadowed by 
intentionality, and therefore, consciousness. 
The pre-intentional functions constitute the 
dimensions of our reflexive or instinctive 
behaviours. All of this really amounts to the 
idea that our basic way of being is that of 
automatic know-how and not conscious de-
liberation. Therefore, when we speak of hu-
man experience and the field of knowledge 
which opens to it, we should first of all give 
priority to our practical involvement in the 
world, to the automatic know-how which 
constitutes the essence of our attunement 
to the world which thereby creates the 
landscape for the experience called being-
-in-the-world, for it is being-in-the-world 
that obliges us to reformulate our basic 
beliefs about the importance of rationality 
and consciousness in human experience. 
We can try to come to terms with our 
practical involvement in the world, in 
which we transparently cope with things, 
if we look closely at the notion of com-
portment:
Comportment (Verhalten) is a very broad term 
that is meant to include every instance in which 
we experience something, and everything that we 
do… [c]omportment is broader than the class of 
deliberate actions (although naturally it includes 
them), because comportment involves things I do 
or experience without an occurent mental state in 
which I intend to do it or register the experience. 
Thus, comportment includes automatic actions, 
for example, which reflect a responsiveness 
to the meaning of a situation (Wrathall 2008, 
pp. 345–46).
Comportments can be subdivided into 
two types: authentic and inauthentic. An 
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inauthentic comportment is most con-
spicuously illustrated by the fact that our 
actions are based on an impersonal mode of 
being, which only means that comportments 
are not really ours in the sense of subjects; 
instead, they function as public ways of 
proceeding. What this means is that there 
really is no inner, or subjective, dimension 
of experience. Our identities or selfhoods 
exist in the actions that we perform and the 
things that we find ourselves using, but we 
are in no way entitled to look for a subject 
outside the context of being-in-the-world. 
Our being is in toto determined by and 
depends upon being-in-the-world.
Therefore, to comport oneself authenti-
cally does not mean to be a non-conformist, 
who happily announces to the world that 
“to be great is to be misunderstood” (Emer-
son 1981, p. 146), or who warns us that 
“[s]ociety everywhere is in conspiracy 
against the manhood of every one of its 
members” (ibid., p. 141). To be authentic 
means to bracket the world and to question 
the existential modes of being. It also means 
that we have to take responsibility for our 
being and yet still remember that who we 
are and what we do is nothing more than a 
borrowing from the public existential para-
digms which we find already operating and 
in which we, as the particular individuals 
that we are, are absorbed. Thus, there is no 
subject outside the object; there is only our 
social way of being—that we have called 
being-in-the-world—which obliges us, at 
the same time, to be with one another.
The ontic dimension of truth which is 
uncovered in our practical involvement 
(as manifested in transparent coping) 
does not completely reject consciousness 
as a dimension of the human experience. 
It simply prevents reductionism, which 
sees consciousness as the epistemological 
landscape that enframes the fullness of our 
experience of the world. Yet consciousness 
as a mode of experience does not exist un-
der a thingly aspect; rather, consciousness 
is attentive as Merleau-Ponty has it, and it 
determines and plays a very important role 
in our involvement in the world (2002, 
p. 31). Nevertheless, the view of conscio-
usness from the perspective that we are 
proposing here is epiphenomenal. Thus, 
consciousness is secondary to being-in-
-the-world. Of course, the epiphenomenal 
character of consciousness was already 
presupposed by psychology. For example, 
Jung sees consciousness as a being that 
emerges from complexes and unconscious 
archetypal content (1990, p. 42). Yet in the 
phenomenological sense consciousness is to 
be derived from our practical coping with 
things. Dreyfus observes that, “[w]hen there 
is a serious disturbance and even deliberate 
activity is blocked, Dasein is forced into still 
another stance, deliberation. This involves 
reflective planning. In deliberation one 
stops and considers what is going on and 
plans what to do, all in a context of involved 
activity” (1991, p. 72).
It follows from the above that con-
sciousness emerges as a side-effect of the 
breakdown of equipment and the com-
portments that were said to accompany it. 
In other words, our basic way of being is 
transparent coping. Yet when a thing breaks, 
transparent coping is no longer possible, 
and we then become conscious, deliberate 
entities. To illustrate this, let us take as an 
example (following Dreyfus) the basic way 
in which we deal with an everyday object 
like the door. In usual circumstances we 
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do not stand before the door as conscious 
subjects deliberating about how to open 
it, how to turn the doorknob, whether to 
pull or to push it, etc. This kind of action is 
performed automatically. It is only when we 
can’t get the door to open that it becomes 
an object of concern, since its functionality 
has broken down and together with it our 
comportment. In this way, consciousness 
comes to be seen as a mechanism or process 
that we employ to restore the functionality 
of things, and therefore, to reinstate the au-
tomatic transparent coping which has been 
disrupted. To avoid being as pessimistic 
as Schopenhauer (R. Taylor 1985, p. 371), 
who believed that life is a mistake, we can, 
on this understanding, come to see subjec-
tivity—the landscape of consciousness—as 
a mistake, since in itself it is the effect of 
the totality of breakdowns that we have 
experienced: not as subjects, of course, but 
as entities that find themselves living in the 
public world according to certain cultural 
and existential paradigms.
On a more speculative note, we could 
come to see consciousness as nothing more 
than the memorization of breakdowns 
which we call concepts. The memori-
zation of breakdowns accords well with 
Freud’s understanding of consciousness 
as developing from traumatic experiences 
which, because of their traumatism, were 
simply remembered (1995, pp. 607–608). 
The view that we are here advocating is 
that consciousness is nothing more than a 
conceptual amplification (memorization) 
of the failures of our transparent coping. 
Thus, there is no need to set the theoretical 
against the pragmatic; rather, we should see 
theory as the continuation of practice, if by 
practice we mean transparent coping. If we 
follow this thinking, we will free ourselves 
from all sorts of dualisms which speak of 
two alternative realities, one real, the other 
merely illusory. Alternatively, we will come 
to understand the forgetfulness of being that 
Heidegger spoke of (1996, p. 1). What he 
meant is that we as a culture have stopped 
questioning being in the ontological sense, 
instead accepting our place amongst the 
ontic beings already present in the world.
From this point on onto-theology has 
tried to put human beings in the seat of sub-
jectivity by assuming that human nature is 
dissociated from the world. Onto-theology 
has committed itself to the cult of power, 
whose purpose is to keep human beings 
in the centre of all experience. In this way 
onto-theology has tried to make human 
being the measure of all things. Thus, on-
totheology can be read as a way of thinking 
that grounds the division of subjectivity 
and objectivity. Yet this can be considered 
as a simple mistake, since onto-theology 
erroneously assumes that the concepts 
which make it possible exist independently 
of reality, though as we have come to see, 
the concepts themselves are nothing more 
than the memorizations of breakdowns of 
our transparent coping. We can, therefore, 
abandon all dualistic forms of thinking and 
understand our experience as extending 
between transparent coping and conscious 
deliberation. Both of these modes of being 
are contextualised by the same existential 
landscape, and there is no need to see them 
as paths to two contraposed realities that 
can be experienced in two different ways. 
Rather, our being as being-in-the-world can 
be loosely compared to the phenomenon of 
culture, which is the ultimate context of all 
our comportments. Geertz, for example, 
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maintains that, “[c]ulture is the fabric of 
meaning in terms of which human beings 
interpret their experience and guide their 
action” (1973, p. 145).
The Landscapes of Language
If we reject the onto-theological estimation 
of the notion of truth, then what status do 
we assign to language? In the conventional 
sense, language was the instrument at the 
disposal of a fixed consciousness that con-
nected the subjective cogito with the pre-
supposed objective existence of the world. 
Accepting truth as alētheia obliges us to 
bracket the subjective—objective division 
in favour of truth as the landscape of being-
-in-the-world, where the world is the reality 
of language, since it is language that reveals 
it by opening up a certain locus where the 
world can be said to take place. In this light, 
we are obliged to agree with Derrida when 
he says that, “[t]here is nothing outside of 
the text [there is no outside text; il n’y a pas 
de hors-texte]” (1997, p. 158).
What needs to be clear from the very 
start is that our understanding of language 
will be the poet’s understanding, not the 
linguist’s. We, therefore, reject the instru-
mental view of language that sees it as 
nothing more than a tool in the hands of 
subjectivity, a tool most necessary for the 
phenomenon we might refer to as subjective 
imperialism. We have a rough representa-
tion of this very phenomenon in the Bible 
where both God and Adam describe things 
in linguistic terms opening up in this way a 
new dimension for experience.
The instrumental understanding of 
language, as observed by C. Taylor, can be 
found in thinkers like Locke, Descartes, 
Hobbes and Condillac, and it roughly amo-
unts to the subject’s ability to use language 
as a tool for the classification of things and 
experiences (2008, p. 435). All that the 
subject has to do is link the word or idea to 
the thing or experience in question. What 
emerges in this light is a vision of the world 
as an atomistic organization of the classi-
fications we have learnt to make. Needless 
to say, the instrumental view presupposes 
that the world is always and already there, 
waiting for the subject to divide it accor-
ding to its scale of interests and concerns. 
Steiner presents us with an instrumental 
understanding of language when he makes 
the observation that:
[t]he classic and the Christian sense of the world 
strive to order reality within the governance of 
language. Literature, philosophy, theology, law, 
the arts of history, are endeavours to enclose 
within the bounds of rational discourse the 
sum of human experience, its recorded past, its 
present condition and future expectations. The 
code of Justinian, the Summa of Acquinas, the 
world chronicles and compendia of medieval 
literature, the Divina Commedia, are attempts 
at total containment. They bear solemn witness 
to the belief that all truth and realness—with the 
exception of a small, queer margin at the very 
top—can be inside the walls of language (1998, 
pp. 13–14).
Steiner’s assumption, therefore, is that 
reality stands in opposition to or outside 
linguistic experience. Against this line of 
reason we have the expressive-constitutive 
theory of language introduced by Herder 
—a member of the Sturm und Drang (C. Tay-
lor 2008, p. 438). What this theory does is 
claim that language is much more than a 
referencing device, as is clearly the case in 
the instrumental view. Of course, no one 
is denying the fact that language expresses 
meanings in the sense that it offers descrip-
tions of things and experiences; however, 
language also creates the landscapes within 
which the existence of things makes sense:
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For the speaker no less than for the listener, 
language is definitely something other than a 
technique for ciphering or deciphering ready-
made significations. Before there can be such 
ready-made significations, language must first 
make significations exist as guideposts by 
establishing them at the intersection of linguistic 
gestures as that which, by common consent, the 
gestures reveal. Our analysis of thought gives us 
the impression that before it finds the words which 
express it, it is already a sort of ideal text that 
our sentences attempt to translate. But the author 
himself has no text to which he can compare his 
writing, and no language prior to language…. 
Language is much more like a sort of being than 
a means, and that is why it can present something 
to us so well (Merleau-Ponty 1964, pp. 42–43).
At this point what we really need to do 
is perform a phenomenological epoche and 
bracket our view of language; what we sho-
uld ask of ourselves is to come to grips with 
the type of spatiality that language makes 
possible. The instrumental view works with 
the typical Newtonian model which treats 
space as a container in which things, inclu-
ding us, happen. From this perspective, we 
find ourselves existing within an objective 
reality that is antecedent to our being. The 
expressive-constitutive theory, on the other 
hand, states that space is not an objective 
phenomenon into which we are thrown 
and from which, with our demise, we are 
extracted. Language opens up the space of 
the in-between in the sense that it emerges 
from speech. In conversation, a certain 
kind of space is opened up which is neither 
subjective nor objective; it is the space of 
our mutual interests and concerns. Thus, 
what language opens up is this common 
space of the lived experience that we have 
earlier referred to as the world, which we 
have argued to be the effect of a cultural 
paradigm rather than the onto-theological 
supposition that holds reality to be some-
thing independent of us.
If language does open up a space of 
the in-between, and if the things that ap-
pear in this space are predetermined by the 
disclosure of language, then we can clearly 
state that things do not exist as we have 
thought conventionally, i.e., in the sense 
of a collection of properties. The proper-
ties that characterise a thing are not really 
the thing’s, but the language’s, since it is 
language which makes the thing possible. 
In other words, we always see reality from 
the perspective of the kind of language that 
shows it to us. In fact, we come to realize 
that there really is nothing like a thing in the 
sense of an object with a fixed configuration 
of properties.
Language discloses things in the space 
of the in-between, which we will now call 
Geviert, i.e., the Fourfold as understood 
by Heidegger (C. Taylor 2008, p. 451). For 
the present purposes it is enough to see the 
Fourfold as the landscape of language. In 
itself it consists of mortals, divinities, the 
earth and the sky. These four elements are 
the fundamental contours of the horizon 
of meanings opened up by language, or 
to put it differently, the Fourfold is what 
language must produce for anything like 
disclosure to happen. Thus, what we have 
earlier referred to as a thing is really a pro-
duct of the Fourfold, i.e., of the relations 
that obtain between mortals, divinities, the 
earth and the sky. To illustrate this, let us try 
to understand the notion of thingness and 
its relation to the Fourfold on the basis of a 
poem by Wallace Stevens:
I placed a jar in Tennessee, 
And round it was, upon a hill. 
It made the slovenly wilderness 
Surround that hill. 
The wilderness rose up to it, 
And sprawled around, no longer wild. 
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The jar was round upon the ground 
And tall and of a port in air. 
It took dominion every where. 
The jar was gray and bare. 
It did not give of bird or bush, 
Like nothing else in Tennessee.
(Stevens 1998, p. 1151) 
We can try to understand the jar’s thing-
ness by seeing it as nothing more than an 
effect of the configuration of and the rela-
tions that hold between the four constitu-
ents. First of all, the jar in its instrumental 
sense fits into the arena of human interests 
and concerns, in this way referring to the 
sphere of the mortals. At the same time, 
however, the jar can be much more than 
a mere instrument. It can have the idea of 
transcendence about itself, and therefore, it 
can be said to possess a moral or religious 
dimension—this being the jar’s relation to 
the divinities. Additionally, the jar must 
be made of something; the material which 
constitutes its nature is the earth which does 
not only refer to ground or soil, but rather it 
needs to be understood as unformed matter. 
Lastly, the notion of the sky roughly refers 
to our understanding of nature in both its 
creative as well as destructive senses.
A creative view of nature can be found, 
for example, in the views of American 
transcendentalists who urge us to become 
transparent eyeballs and seek communion 
between man and natura naturata / natura 
naturans (Emerson 1981, p. 11). On the 
other hand, the destructive Darwinian view 
of nature is reflected in Stephen Crane’s 
short story The Open Boat, where we are 
told that “[s]hipwrecks are apropos of 
nothing” (1994, p. 790)—a metaphor that 
considers the meaning of existence which 
from this point of view is quite vain.
Generally speaking, what we, following 
Heidegger, have called a thing is the effect 
of the relations that hold between the four 
constituents of the Fourfold. In other words, 
the thing appears in its instrumentality to 
mortals. Its transcendent nature is understood 
on the basis of the deities that exist within 
a cultural paradigm, the same applies to the 
earth as the material from which a thing is 
made; and lastly, the sky or nature is the idea 
which both preserves as well as threatens the 
jar’s being—it is the élan that allows it to be, 
but at the same time, it is the force that will 
one day annihilate it. Thus, the understanding 
of a thing depends on the understanding of 
nature within a given cultural paradigm and 
during a particular historical period. 
Conclusion 
We should abandon the view that holds 
that there exists some kind of theoretical 
“masterplan” to everyday reality. The Pla-
tonic belief that theory is the refined status 
of practice is untrue; rather, it is quite the 
reverse. Prima facie, we are practical beings 
that cope with things on a transparent basis 
only to later discover that the breakdowns 
of practical involvement are the seeds sown 
on the soil of a new landscape that we call 
consciousness, which is connected with the 
instrumental application of language.
Perhaps, if we take into consideration 
what was mentioned above about language 
and alētheia, we will finally be in a position 
to understand such mysterious sayings as 
language is “the house of being” (Heidegger 
1971, p. 22), since it is from the perspective 
of language that we come to see the world. 
Taylor observes that “language, through its 
telos, dictates a certain mode of expression, 
a way of formulating matters which can help 
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to restore thingness. It tells us what to say, 
dictates the poetic, or thinkerly word…” 
(2008, p. 451). Additionally, what emerges 
from this stance is the view that it is not we 
that speak, but language—and therefore, 
language is not a tool at the disposal of the 
subject, but rather, it creates the subject’s 
self-experience by bringing the Fourfold 
into being and allowing for things to appear 
as mattering in a certain historical way. 
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20 I .  PROBLEMOS IR SPRENDIMAI / PROBLEMY I  ICH ROZWIĄZANIA
Wojciech Majka
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Zainteresowania naukowe: historia literatury 
brytyjskiej, historia literatury amerykańskiej, 
fenomenologia w teorii literatury i studiach kul-
turowych, psychologia a literatura, europejska 
tradycja intelektualna
PRAWDA JAKO  FENOMENOLOGICZ-
NY PEJZAŻ PERCEPCJI
Streszczenie
W głównej mierze artykuł skupia się na przedsta-
wieniu istoty prawdy (alatheia) rozumianej z per-
spektywy typowo fenomenologicznej. Heidegger 
bowiem uważał, że istota prawdy nie powinna być 
ograniczana do rozumienia jej jako przynależności 
i zgodności, jak to tradycyjnie robiono. Innymi 
słowy, prawda nie powinna być ograniczona do 
odpowiednich lub też nieodpowiednich sposobów 
przedstawienia doświadczenia kognitywnego. W 
gruncie rzeczy pojęcie prawdy powinno być po-
równywane z istotą percepcji, w której mamy do 
czynienia z tym, jak świat odsłania się w ludzkim 
doświadczeniu. Przyjęta perspektywa zawiesza 
przeciwstawność podmiotowości i przedmioto-
wości, które stanowią podstawę myślenia metafi-
zycznego już od czasów Platona. Inaczej mówiąc, 
podmiot nie jest zalążkiem doświadczenia, lecz 
biernym odbiorcą bycia-w-świecie – odnosząc 
się do terminologii Merleau-Ponty’ego – rozprze-
strzeniającego się wokół niego. Fenomenologiczne 
ujęcie prawdy zobowiązuje nas jednocześnie do 
traktowania samej istoty języka w sposób nie sym-
boliczny, to znaczy język nie tyle biernie odzwier-
ciedla rzeczywistość, co poprzez wyistaczanie 
słowa odsłania cały świat. Inaczej rzecz ujmując, 
język nie stanowi jedynie abstrakcyjnego systemu 
znaków, opartego na relacji znaczonego i znaczą-
cego (jak u Saussure’a), ale jest ontologicznym 
punktem wyjścia, z którego postrzegamy świat i 
nasze istnienie w świecie.       
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: Merleau-Ponty, Hei-
degger, język, odsłonięcie, prawda, zgodność, 
parousia, wolność, istota, percepcja, idea. 
Wojciech Majka
Pedagoginis Krokuvos universitetas, Lenkija 
Moksliniai interesai: britų literatūros istorija, 
amerikiečių literatūros istorija, literatūros ir 
kultūros studijų fenomenologija, psichologija 
ir literatūra, intelektualinės Europos tradicijos
TIESA IR FENOMENOLOGINIS SUVOKI-
MAS
Santrauka
Straipsnio tikslas yra pateikti fenomenologinį 
tiesos idėjos (alētheia) supratimą. Pasak M. Hei-
deggerio, tiesa nėra apribota tradiciniu tiesos per-
teikimu, tokiu kaip koherentiškumas ar analogija. 
Kitaip tariant, tiesa nėra ribojama tinkamomis arba 
netinkamomis tam tikro kognityviosios patirties 
aspekto reprezentacijos formomis. Tiesa artimesnė 
suvokimo sąvokai, kalbančiai apie bendrąjį kelią, 
kur pasaulis yra  atviras žmogaus supratimui.
Žinoma, toks požiūris reikalauja suskliausti 
sub jekto-objekto padalijimą, kuris nuo Platono lai-
kų yra už tradicinio metafizinio mąstymo ribų. Ki-
taip tariant, objektas nėra patirties atspirties taškas, 
bet gana pasyvus Pasaulio–Būties tipo recipientas. 
Fenomenologinis tiesos supratimo aiškinimas mus 
įpareigoja taip pat pažvelgti į kalbą ne reprezen-
tatyviąja prasme, bet greičiau kaip į esminį būties 
žodyną, per kurį atsiskleidžiamas pasaulis. Kitaip 
tariant, kalba yra ne tik abstrakti ženklų sistema, 
pagrįsta F. de Saussure’o signifikatu–signifikantu. 
Tai yra ontologinė pozicija, iš kurios taško mes 
suvokiame pasaulį ir mūsų egzistavimą jame.
REIKŠMINIAI ŽODŽIAI: Merleau-Ponty, 
Heideggeris, kalba, atskleidimas, tiesa, atitikimas, 
laisvė, esmė, suvokimas, idėja.
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